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A he financial press is full of stories
lately about the risks associated with
financial derivatives. The casual reader
might think that some new risks have
been invented, or that our financial sys-
tem is riskier now than it was a few
years ago.
Neither conjecture is true. Nor is it true
that an overriding policy priority today
is the need for new legislation or new
regulation to deal with derivatives. I
realize that some people believe a mod-
ern financial system can be stable only
when buttressed by wise regulation and
other government interventions. Natu-
rally, these people view financial inno-
vations like derivatives as potentially
destabilizing challenges to policymakers
and regulators.
My own view is that financial innova-
tion tends to be inherently stabilizing,
not destabilizing. Modern financial sys-
tems—and, for that matter, market
economies based on private property and
price systems—are inherently resilient.
Financial innovations reinforce the nat-
ural discipline and stabilizing forces at
work in a market economy.
Financial derivatives are innovations that
allow us to buy and sell risks in new
ways. What needs to be understood is
that derivatives are innovations in risk
management, not in risk itself. Innova-
tions in risk management should be wel-
comed, as when wheat farmers first
learned to lock in the price they would
get for their current crop by using futures
contracts. All businesses and investments
involve risks. Improving the allocation of
these risks should make individuals bet-
ter off and should reduce, not increase,
the likelihood that financial shocks will
damage the real economy.
In this Economic Commentary, I hope to
make two points:
1) Risk exists because there is uncer-
tainty in the world. Successful innova-
tions in risk management, such as deriv-
ative instruments, do not make financial
markets riskier. Rather, they enhance
wealth by allowing comparative advan-
tages to evolve in identifying and man-
aging risks.
2) Government supervision of financial
activity can strengthen the ultimate dis-
cipline coming from the marketplace.
However, regulation of, and intervention
in, financial markets in today's global
environment will have unintended con-
sequences by defeating comparative
advantages and by socializing risk.
• Specialization and Risk
People often say they want to "reduce
risk," "minimize risk," "eliminate risk,"
or "avoid risk." Such language suggests
that risk is undesirable, as it generally is
for most people. However, individuals
shed risk largely by passing it along to
others. For the system as a whole, risk
remains unchanged—it is simply borne
by someone else. This someone may be
a specialist who is better equipped to
manage it or, in the case of public pol-
icy, a citizenry that may or may not be
aware that a risk has been socialized.
Over the past year, derivative finan-
cial instruments have come under
intense scrutiny, prompting some to
call for new legislation or regulation
to address their perceived risks. At a
recent academic conference, Federal
Reserve Bank of Cleveland President
Jerry L. Jordan gave his perspective
on the issues. In this excerpt of his
paper, he emphasizes that these con-
tracts represent innovations in risk
management, not in risk. As partici-
pants develop fuller disclosure and
better accounting and legal conven-
tions, derivatives will enhance
wealth by allowing risk to be borne
more efficiently. Ultimately, regula-
tion comes from the global market-
place and should not be distorted by
a central-bank safety net.Physicists say that matter can be neither
created nor destroyed, but its form can
be converted from solid to liquid to gas.
Something similar can be said of risk.
Uncertainty about the future exists in
nature and can take a variety of forms—
uncertainty about the weather, about
income, about tax receipts, about interest
rates, or about foreign exchange rates,
for example. Such uncertainties can be
transformed into risk—that is, into a
more or less reliable set of probabilities
based on accumulated knowledge. Risk
gauges the degree of imperfection in our
predictions, sometimes summarized in
the standard deviation or variance of a
predicted value.
Risk can be converted from one type to
another. Interest-rate risk can be trans-
formed into credit risk, for example, by
a swap or futures contract. Risk can be
transferred from one party to another, as
when a homeowner refinances a fixed-
rate mortgage at a floating rate. Spe-
cific risks can be subdivided into com-
ponent parts, as when an investor holds
a floating-rate, government-guaranteed
loan. Here, the risk on the loan has been
parceled out into interest-rate risk,
assumed by the borrower; credit risk,
assumed by the government; and pre-
payment risk, assumed by the investor.
In short, risk can be managed.
Financial risk management has been
evolving for centuries, but with the
dawning of "the information age," it has
undergone a significant change. First,
modern telecommunications technology
has broken down geographical and polit-
ical boundaries that once isolated local
markets. We now operate in a global
marketplace on the basis of global infor-
mation. Second, modern computing
power makes it feasible to identify, sim-
ulate, and market various types of risk
without transferring ownership of any
underlying assets.
Redistributing risk from less to more
efficient specialists means, in general,
moving toward a more efficient alloca-
tion of risk-bearing resources. Wealth is
enhanced because despite savers' trepi-
dation about interest-rate risk, for exam-
ple, more houses are built as more mort-
gages are packaged into collateralized
mortgage obligations and sold in the
global capital market. As a result, less of
something else may be built, but the
world is better off because markets have
used the new financial technology to
offer savers a higher return per unit of
risk, and consumers a lower cost of con-
sumption per unit of risk.
• Derivative Financial
Instruments
Financial derivatives were being used
long before the 1970s, when organized
exchange trading began. Thereafter,
most derivative financial contracts were
traded on the commodities exchanges, so
that holders of contracts were protected
by the exchanges themselves, as well as
by Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) rules. The exchanges, as the
counterparty to each contract traded,
had a clear self-interest in promoting
the integrity of trading and delivery,
and that remains the approach to super-
vision of exchange-traded derivative
contracts today.
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The most rapidly growing segment of
the derivatives market, and the locus of
recent innovation, is in over-the-counter
(OTC) contracts. These contracts are
outside the purview of any exchange
rules. They include ordinary currency
and (largely) interest-rate swaps, plus a
small portion in more exotic hybrid con-
tracts. Typically, one or more of the
counterparties to an OTC contract is a
dealer, frequently a money-center bank,
with the contract tailored to the unique
needs of its counterparty—much like a
commercial loan.
Most banks say they enter into deriva-
tive contracts simply as end users, to
meet their own risk management needs.
The dozen or so large dealer banks, how-
ever, are counterparties to a large per-
centage of all OTC contracts. These
banks must manage the net risk that
results from their dealer position, earn-
ing their income from a bid-ask spread.
Even a derivatives dealer will not neces-
sarily try to run a riskless book of offset-
ting derivatives exposures, but instead
may want to use its dealer position to
offset a risk exposure elsewhere on its
books. For end users as well as dealers,
derivatives must be part of a larger risk-
management strategy. Current account-
ing practices, of course, do not produce
an integrated record of risk management.
This is why some supposed losses from
derivatives are not losses at all, but sim-
ply represent the offset to gains else-
where in the business. Offsetting the
gains and losses yields the neutral posi-
tion the firm was trying to ensure by off-
loading certain types of risk. Referring
to a firm's derivatives business as an
actual or intended profit center, on the
other hand, suggests an intention to do
more than contribute an ingredient to
risk management, perhaps by arbitraging
some market niche, or simply by engag-
ing in informed speculation.
• Supervision and Regulation
The beauty of a market economy is that
innovations like derivatives can be
expected to have good results, as the
invisible hand—market supply and
demand—mediates among the self-
interests of potential users. Adam
Smith's economic theory, however,
seems at variance with the spectacular
losses attributed to derivatives activity in
recent years. Current proposals to regu-
late derivatives are, at least in part, a
reaction to those losses. Is self-interest
really a sufficient basis for further devel-
opment of derivatives markets?
One reason for huge losses undoubtedly
is lack of familiarity with the new tech-
nology, but this doesn't suggest a need
for new legislation or regulation. The re-
cent spate of losses has been associated,
for the most part, with so-called "exotic"
derivatives that make up only a small
fraction of the market. Of course, "plain
vanilla" OTC currency and interest-rate
swaps and futures can have very long
maturities, so experience to date is not
necessarily the whole story there. Also,
most losses on derivatives contracts to
date have been absorbed from the capital
of the user, its parent, or its sponsor, and
not from any discount on the value of
the contract to the party "in the money."
The counterparties of those who have
lost a lot have indeed gained a lot, but
they can't expect to lay off risk on such
favorable terms in the future.The market discipline of losses can be a
powerful educator. In fact, however,
many of the recent highly publicized
losses may not have taught us much
about derivatives. Instead, they have
administered refresher courses with
titles like "interest rates are not a one-
way bet," and "leveraging assets lever-
ages risk," and "unsupervised employ-
ees create problems." The potential for
loss has provided an incentive for con-
certed action by all market participants
to change the infrastructure of markets.
Law, accounting, and standard market
practices devised in isolated markets for
a few paper instruments must be updated
to cover new derivative instruments in
the global market. Recommendations of
the Group of Thirty, for example, illus-
trate the self-interest of the participants
in the OTC derivatives market in seek-
ing the basis for more reliable evalua-
tions of risks.
Government can help to strengthen insti-
tutional arrangements that promote mar-
ket discipline. Most observers agree that
reliable information is not yet consis-
tently available about positions in deriv-
atives. Supervisory authorities are in a
unique position to help market partici-
pants develop common forms of disclo-
sure. In the United States, we could
release our bank examiners' CAMEL
and BOPEC ratings, for example.
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already stimulate the spread of informa-
tion within banking organizations by
using the examination to ask fundamen-
tal questions that can otherwise be over-
looked. Is a bank's strategy to be only an
end user, or also a dealer in derivatives?
Do staff, top management, and directors
all have the same understanding of the
bank's derivatives strategy? How consis-
tently is that strategy being communi-
cated to shareholders and to the public?
Another, more difficult, step will be to
incorporate off-balance-sheet risks into
firm-specific capital adequacy measures.
In the case of exchange-traded contracts,
risk is not so contentious an issue. Daily
marking-to-market and margin require-
ments protect the exchange, while the
strength of the exchange protects the
counterparty in the money. OTC deriva-
tives, in contrast, cannot be marked to
market directly, so another method of
monitoring exposures must be devel-
oped. The U.S. federal banking supervi-
sors currently have a proposal out for
comment based on the work of the Basle
Committee of central banks.
Not all proposals for government action
in the derivatives market are as benign as
generating better information. As a rule,
it is wiser to let market forces mete out
losses as well as profits, rather than forc-
ing everyone to follow suboptimal rules
and socializing losses. Certainly there
can be no permanent detailed direction of
derivative practices from regulatory per-
sonnel whose technical expertise, while
substantial, cannot match that of market
players. Nonetheless, there is a crucial
role for oversight by the chartering
authority or, more significantly, by the
provider of deposit insurance in protect-
ing the public trust and the public purse.
In Ronald Reagan's phrase about arms
control, "Trust, but verify."
• Systemic Risk
Financial innovations in general, and
derivative instruments in particular, may
represent nothing more than new spe-
cializations being developed to manage
risk more efficiently. These new risk
specializations should increase eco-
nomic efficiency and human well-being,
as their benefits are realized through
market trading. This assumes, however,
that the social costs of derivatives are no
different from their private costs, and
that both the issuer and the holder of a
derivative instrument recognize—and, in
the long run, pay and receive—a price
that covers all costs. Some legislators
and other observers of the derivatives
phenomenon are not convinced that pri-
vately perceived costs fully cover social
costs. The difference, or the "external-
ity" that is not internal to the operations
of buyer and seller, is attributed to poten-
tial systemic risk consequences.
Systemic risk refers to the possibility of a
domino-like collapse of a number of
interrelated borrowers and lenders, trig-
gered by some initial failure in one mar-
ket. If private calculations of risk encom-
pass only the possibility of the initial
failure, but not the potential domino
effect, then market participants assume
risk exposures whose perceived private
costs understate their true social costs.
Systemic risk is related to the phenome-
non of financial bubbles and manias —
like the process that drove the Nikkei
average close to 40,000 in Japan in late
1989 and that is now driving sales of
shares in the MMM enterprise in Russia,
despite government warnings that it is
nothing more than a Ponzi scheme. In a
bubble, market participants become
caught up in an enthusiastic belief in the
impossible. When the bubble bursts, a
domino-like wave of failures envelops
the market as the world comes back to
reality. In the case of systemic risk, there
is no bubble to burst, but only a failure to
price the chance of something else trig-
gering a domino-like wave of failures.
The popularity of OTC derivatives con-
tracts might be construed as a temporary
bubble, particularly from the perspective
of those whose mismanagement has pro-
duced spectacular losses. With hind-
sight, even private cost apparently was
seriously underestimated. Continued
rapid growth of derivatives contracts at
the pace of the past several years cer-
tainly would begin to raise the mania
flag. Even in a global financial market-
place, there must exist a finite limit to
shiftable risk. For now, however, that
point does not seem to be in sight.
Modern discussions of systemic risk do
not emphasize the mass delusion of a
bubble in setting up the dominoes for a
financial collapse. The systemic risk
concept seems to postulate some new
and different externality that makes pri-
vate calculations of risk understate the
true susceptibility of financial contracts
to loss. The absence of incentives to
internalize all costs associated with cer-
tain instruments creates a problem in the
aggregate that is not apparent at the
microeconomic level. The presence of
this presumed externality invites govern-
ment intervention to restore the equality
of private and social marginal cost.
Identifying the source of the externality
is a major difficulty with the systemic
risk concept. Some have argued that bor-
rowing is like an internal combustionengine, polluting the financial market
atmosphere. When I lend to you by
reducing my liquidity or otherwise
accept greater risk, 1 increase the proba-
bility that 1 will be unable to meet my
obligations to others. However, this
would represent a negative externality
from the point of view of my creditors
only if they were unaware of my lend-
ing to you. The pollution argument
breaks down to the extent that my credi-
tors, acting out of self-interest, are able
to internalize the supposed externality.
Loan covenants, for example, protect a
creditor from a debtor's entry into un-
foreseen debt or credit relationships.
More generally, the expectation of inter-
nalizing this potential externality is rec-
ognized in the eternal watchphrase,
"Know thy counterparty!"
In the case of derivatives, a variant of
the pollution argument has emphasized
the concentrated dealer market. Each
of the dozen or so major dealers is the
source of an interdependence among the
exposures of its worldwide circle of end
users. Evaluations of the counterparty
risk exposures of these end users should
include a dealer risk, analogous to
country risk, that would be too trivial
to notice in a less-concentrated market.
Similar allowances might be made for
interdependence arising from the use
of common operations centers, pay-
ment networks, legal advisors, or credit
rating services, to the extent those were
acquired in concentrated markets.
Evaluating risk is not a simple matter;
it involves compound probabilities and
cross-correlations.
In general, the interdependence envi-
sioned in the systemic risk model seems
to involve the sensitivities of many large
counterparties to one another. Deriva-
tives and globalization of markets may
indeed be producing more complex
compound probabilities of trouble.
However, so too is the information age
vastly expanding the ability to monitor
counterparties and markets. If sophisti-
cated financial engineering can produce
complex derivative products, cannot
that same sophistication also estimate
the increasingly complex compound
probabilities of trouble?
There seems to be no reason to believe
that the potential externality of such
complex financial relationships has out-
distanced an increasingly powerful abil-
ity to internalize that possibility. The
commercial overhead of modern finan-
cial centers—including satellite-fed, on-
line, worldwide information and moni-
toring systems, armies of legal talent,
and even on-site monitors from the rat-
ing agencies—all reflect the substantial
expenditures of firms trying to internal-
ize their risk exposures.
As long as economic agents are able to
estimate complex probabilities of fail-
ures, systemic risk is indistinguishable
from normal credit risk. Knowing your
counterparty, your counterparty's coun-
terparties, and so on, should lead to
quality spreads in market prices, to pru-
dent loss reserves and capital from
which to absorb losses, and to equality
of the private and social cost of risk.
• Moral Hazard
Apprehension about the systemic risk
consequences of derivatives seems to
be associated with a widespread con-
viction that it is the job of govern-
ment—meaning central banks and
deposit insurance providers—to pre-
vent a systemic collapse. Even if gov-
ernment had no such intention, a mar-
ket conviction that it would come to
the rescue would lead to an externality
and to excessive risk-taking. Systemic
risk would become real only because
of the erroneous belief in a bailout.
Here is where central banks must tread
very carefully. There is a moral hazard
in reassuring markets, or in allowing
markets to believe incorrectly, that a
lender of last resort will provide a low-
cost way to prevent a contagious spread
of broken promises. If systemic risk is
becoming as worrisome as we are led to
believe by some commentators, the rea-
son may not be innovations in financial
technology such as derivatives, but the
moral hazard of central banks' implicit
willingness to underwrite that risk.
Moral hazard is a real danger in central
banking. This was demonstrated during
the last great spurt of financial innova-
tion, the cash management revolution of
the 1970s. Prophets had foretold the
coming of cashless transactions. In the
United States, however, both cash trans-
actions and cash balances were elimi-
nated. What happened was that the Fed-
eral Reserve, first implicitly and then,
after 1976, explicitly, guaranteed that a
bank receiving a Fedwire payment
would have good funds whether or not
the paying bank had sufficient funds in
its account at the time the payment was
made. The moral hazard of this guaran-
tee was that paying banks would not
maintain sufficient funds to cover their
payments, thereby producing precisely
the condition against which the guaran-
tee was designed to guard. By the
beginning of the 1980s, well over $100
billion of Federal Reserve daylight
credit was being created each day, on
demand, to accommodate transactions
and thereby temporarily converting pri-
vate risk exposures into Federal Reserve
risk exposures.
Efforts to reduce and manage Federal
Reserve payments system risk in the
past decade have required the painstak-
ing construction of institutional mecha-
nisms to make the cost of daylight credit
explicit to the banks that use it. This in
turn can be expected to make obsolete
those market institutions that evolved
on a foundation of free daylight credit.
A risk management revolution is now in
full swing. The specter of growing sys-
temic risk is used to rationalize nonbank
access to the Federal Reserve's discount
window, to seek direct nonbank access
to Fedwire payment finality, and to call
for regulatory controls on derivatives.
The danger—the moral hazard—in-
volved in a ready assurance of central
bank assistance lies in the potential con-
version of private risk exposures into
Federal Reserve risk exposures. The
twofold challenge is to stop falling
dominoes, if necessary, and to avoid
subsidizing risk taking. A first step in
meeting that challenge might be to
make the discount rate a penalty rate,
not a below-market rate.• Concluding Remarks
Rapidly spreading use of derivatives
suggests that they are expected to add
value for those on both sides of con-
tracts. Derivatives don't add to the risks
inherent in a modern financial system.
They do, however, allow risk to be
borne more efficiently.
Financial innovations are to be wel-
comed as basically wealth enhancing.
As John La Ware, one of my Federal
Reserve colleagues, has said, "Deriva-
tives ... have been used primarily to
contain risk.... A ... useful definition of
banking is that the banker essentially
manages financial risks for his deposi-
tors. His job is to manage risk, not
avoid it."
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The information age is changing the
way risk is managed. This is simply a
part of the broader scientific revolution
we call the information age, described
by economist and former U.S. Secre-
tary of State George Schultz as "... the
computer and the technology of instant
communication...transforming the
worlds of finance, manufacturing, poli-
tics, scientific research, diplomacy,
indeed, everything."
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Some of the pressure for new legislation
and regulation is based on the view that
the entire financial system could be
jeopardized by the fallout from losses
sustained by a single large participant in
derivatives markets. My view is that
such vulnerability has not been estab-
lished. In fact, I believe that certain pro-
posals might actually encourage sys-
temic risk by penalizing standard
risk-hedging methods and by changing
behavior to get around the regulations.
Those who argue that financial innova-
tion calls for new regulations should
remember that new regulations often
stimulate new innovation.
To the extent that derivatives are not
well understood, surprises should be
expected and should be no cause for
concern as long as information about
the use of derivatives is not hidden, and
is matched by attention to the adequacy
of liquidity and capital. A more signifi-
cant danger is that we may smother
market incentives for counterparty
scrutiny with overly generous assur-
ances of central bank assistance.
The ultimate regulator of any economic
activity is the market. In the case of
finance, the global marketplace is a
powerful source of discipline. As we
consider proposals for government
action, I suggest that we establish a lit-
mus test. Namely, in the words of Fed-
eral Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan,
"The relevant question ... is whether pri-
vate market regulation is enhanced or
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